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Real GDP per capita and capital stock in Cote d'Ivoire grew strongly from 1960 to 1979, but have declined ever since, for twenty-five years. As a result, the country has traveled a full circle from economic success to failure in little more than a generation. What are the long-term factors behind this dismal growth story? Are the Ivorian development problems mostly of recent origin? Or there are more fundamental, economic factors that explain its long term performance?
Four principal conclusions are as follows: First, Cote d'Ivoire's long-term growth performance is not fully explained by temporary factors (e.g., CFA overvaluation or recent conflict). Longer term factors such as capital accumulation, productivity, and terms of trade are key to understanding the country's This paper-a product of the Poverty Reduction & Economic Management Unit 4 (AFTP4), Africa Poverty Reduction & Economic Management (PREM) Department-is part of a larger effort in the department to understand the sources and constraints of long-term economic growth in African countries. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at zbogetic@worldbank.org.
performance as is the policy of specialization in a single commodity--cocoa.
Second, the long-term decline in per capita output started well before the currency overvaluation, and at a time of political stability, and is related to a major, secular deterioration in terms of trade that started after 1976.
Third, total factor productivity estimates indicate that TFP per capita also grew until it hit a plateau in 1976-78, and then shrank thereafter, despite gains in human capital accumulation.
Fourth, Cote d'Ivoire has pursued a policy of specialization in cocoa beans but this bet on a single commodity has ultimately failed. The strategy that brought prosperity during the 1970s resulted in a growth failure when cocoa prices began declining since 1976.
Long Term Economic and Demographic Trends
There are two distinct periods in recent economic history of Cote d'Ivoire: the "boom" period of 1960 to (about) 1979 and the period of economic decline from 1980 to 2002 (Figures 1-2 ). This pattern is apparent whether one looks at broad trends in the overall, per capita real output or its components, as well as population, and labor force (Table 1) . GDP, consumption, and investment peaked in 1979, then fell in the early 1980s. Thereafter, the three variables recovered and began to climb, but at a slower rate 1 9 6 0 1 9 6 2 1 9 6 4 1 9 6 6 1 9 6 8 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000
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Finally, Cote d'Ivoire's growth record also compares poorly with main comparator groups of countries, suggesting that country-specific rather than regional factors are behind this performance. Using real per capita growth data for 1993-2002, we compared Cote d'Ivoire's growth with that of several other "peer groups" or benchmark sets of countries 3 . Cote d'Ivoire grew more slowly than developing countries worldwide, and slower than both sub-Saharan African countries and West African countries. Cote d'Ivoire also grew more slowly than most of the countries in the West CFA-franc zone, and slower than most countries in a set of African countries experiencing conflict during [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] . Cote d'Ivoire's poor long-term growth cannot be dismissed as "typical" of either developing countries or African countries, and is not explained by the recent conflict.
The Macroeconomic and Social Impact of the Crisis 2002-03
The brief 2002-03 civil conflict 4 came on top of the two decades of declining per capita real GDP and rising poverty. As such, the conflict alone does not explain the secular economic decline since late 1970s; it aggravated the already unfavourable longterm economic trends. In this section, we briefly discuss the short term impact of the crisis, focusing mainly on the social consequences. After the 1994 devaluation, which triggered gains in competitiveness and four years of rising per capita income and modest gains in poverty reduction, in 1999-2000, the Ivorian economy was almost simultaneously hit by a large terms of trade shock and political turmoil. Real per capita 3 See the Annex for details. 4 For details, see World Bank (2003) . 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 Table 1 .2 below in section on the social impact of the crisis). Post-Crisis -3.0 3.5 -1.9 7.5
Source: IMF and World Bank staff estimates.
While post-1994 gains in competitiveness have been largely preserved, since end-2000 there was a real appreciation of the CFA franc. (Figure 5 ). Since the initial overshooting after 1994, the real effective exchange rate remained relatively stable, hovering at about 30 percent below the pre-1994 level. However, since October 2000 until end 2003, there has been a real appreciation of about 20 percent. Part of the real appreciation reflects the appreciation of the euro vis-à-vis the dollar. But at the sectoral level, decline in productivity, and increased cost of production, transportation, and trade in industries located in the war affected areas indicate loss of competitiveness. Part of the regional trade and transshipment has been diverted to neighboring countries (e.g., Ghana).
The Social Impact
The social situation before the outbreak of the civil war in The 2002-03 crisis worsened the social situation in a very short period of time, resulting in a full-fledged social and humanitarian crisis. Between 500 and 1,000 persons were killed and about 1.2 million people--about 6 percent of the population--became internally displaced (IDPs) or sought refuge in neighboring countries. Of this number, about 800,000 were internally displaced, and the remaining 400,000 left for neighboring countries. 6 An estimated 500-700,000 children left school and many schools and medical services effectively stopped operating, in part because of the departure of civil servants and the breakdown of the central administration in the areas controlled by ex-rebels. An estimated 20,000 people were rendered homeless in Abidjan as a result of the government's destruction of shantytowns (quartiers précaires), which were adjacent to military and other sensitive areas, 7 under the campaign to fight "the infiltration of the rebels." As a result, by end-2002 poverty rate likely increased by an estimated 4 percentage points to about 42 ½ percent of the population; with further increase in displaced/refugee population, it is likely to have increased by an additional 1 ½ percentage points in early 2003 (Table 3) . In rural areas, poverty rose because of the loss of farmers' crop incomes; in urban areas, unemployment and poverty rose due to closures of a number of large companies (e.g., SITARAIL for example at the beginning of the crisis; but the rail line was later reopened following an agreement on reopening of the border between Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire) and dwindling activity in industry (e.g., textiles), transport and domestic trade. The adverse regional impact on the poor--mostly in rural areas--has varied from moderate in the south and south-east to severe in the north and, particularly, the west. 8 In the south and south-east, where farming was least affected by the conflict, cocoa farmers also benefited from higher cocoa prices and the successful exports of most of their production. Coffee producers, particularly in the west, have suffered from low international prices, inability to collect their entire crop because of the lack of security, increased local marketing margins, and the cost of roadblocks. Roadblocks alone may have added up to CFAF50/kg, about 25 percent to "normal" farm-gate prices. In the Savannah region, the social situation is probably critical: at least 30 percent of cotton production was estimated to have been lost, resulting in significant losses of incomes and a sharp rise of poverty in what is already the poorest region of the country.
The composition of priority public expenditures 9 shifted away from education, health and social spending, towards military, security, and humanitarian expenditures. In particular, the combined share of education, health and economic infrastructure in 2002 was budgeted at 50 percent of total priority expenditures, but the actual share was only 42 percent; reported defense spending raised its share from 8.7 to almost 10 percent. The most pro-poor public social expenditures--on primary education and basic health--may have suffered disproportionately, and the incidence of HIV/AIDS is on the rise. The latest information suggest the incidence of HIV is much higher rate in the war affected regions (about 20) percent than previously reported (12 percent). The risk of other major diseases (malaria, cholera, and yellow fever) increased.
Social and institutional infrastructure (e.g., schools, clinics, and local government institutions and agencies), especially in poor rural areas, has suffered more than the traditional economic infrastructure (e.g., transportation networks, water and electricity). Numerous schools and local medical facilities have been reportedly abandoned and/or looted, and the qualified local government cadre has left the most affected regions. Major economic infrastructure (e.g., roads, rail, ports, water, and electricity) have not suffered from extensive war-related damage, but there is little doubt that its productivity has declined as operations and maintenance and critical repair was postponed, requiring more costly operating and capital repair later on. Despite reduced receipts and arrears from Ghana, the power sector has so far withstood the crisis. 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 Annual 1961 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 An (Figure 9 ). By 2000, raw cocoa represented 80 percent of the country's commodity exports, over 50 percent of all exported goods and services, and 21 percent of GDP. Considering that several other sectors are also cocoa-related, it is clear that the country has become very dependent upon one raw commodity, cocoa. Table 2) . Real prices for raw cocoa, cotton and coffee increased on world commodity markets from 1960 until they hit all-time highs in 1977. After 1977 real prices crashed, and on average have declined steadily ever since. Since 1977, cocoa price declines have greatly exceeded production increases. The results for cocoa are reinforced by developments in coffee and cotton during . Coffee production has not increased, while real prices declined. Cotton output increased, but real prices fell. Simply put, raw commodity production in general and cocoa production in particular have been very low rate-ofreturn investments for Cote d'Ivoire. Consequently, the strategy of specialization in cocoa has not been successful.
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Since Cote d'Ivoire as the world's leading cocoa producer has certain market power, the world price trend is not entirely exogenous. 10 Regression estimates provide evidence that Cote d'Ivoire's cocoa production (quantity) impacts world prices, and that a structural break occurred in the market in about 1975, the year in which Cote d'Ivoire's share of world output rose to 15 percent (Table 4) . For 1961 -1977 , 1977 , and 1961 Sources: Commodity production quantity data is from the FAO, and world prices in US dollars from commodity exchanges are provided by the IMF. The US CPI is used to adjust for inflation.
Capital, Labor, And Total Factor Productivity
The following estimates of the capital stock, human capital, and output per worker are hoped to shed light on the underlying, long-term factors behind Cote d'Ivoire's growth performance. We begin by discussing the evolution of the capital stock and then an estimate of the educational attainment of the labor force.
Physical Capital Stock
Since 1982, Cote d'Ivoire's capital stock has declined with the short-lived exception of the immediate post-devaluation years (1995-99). Capital stocks are known to be difficult to measure, flows less so. Our estimate of the capital stock uses the conventional "perpetual inventory method" based on gross capital formation, an initial capital stock and a depreciation rate of 10 percent 11 (Figure 10 ). According to our estimate, after 1979, the increase in the real capital stock of the entire economy slowed dramatically and since 1982 actually declined, and never recovered. 1 9 6 0 1 9 6 2 1 9 6 4 1 9 6 6 1 9 6 8 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 2
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Per capita capital stock has also declined dramatically over the past two decades (Figure 11 ). According to these estimates, per capita real output and physical capital grew strongly until 1979, then fell precipitously. From a peak of over $7,000 per worker, capital stock fell to about $2,500 per worker in 2002, estimated in 1995 dollars. Real output per worker fell from a peak of nearly $3,400 to only $2,000 in the same period. 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 Ye a rs since inde pende nce
Human Capital
Educational attainment is clearly associated with human capital, and is used in the literature as a proxy for human capital or "labor force quality". This indicator is commonly used to measure "human capital" or "effective labor force."
Human capital, as measured by educational attainment, has risen in Cote d'Ivoire since independence (Figure 12 ). This is evidenced by an estimate 12 of the average years of schooling per worker for the period 1960 to 2002 13 . Since most educated persons work, most youth entering the labor force are educated, and as average years of schooling for those who do attend school is rising, the estimated average schooling of workers rises much faster than the basic literacy rate for the entire population. One important caveat: this estimate does not take into account the likely impact of AIDS on human capital, which has been particularly important since mid-1980s. 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 Years 1960 -2002 Total Factor Productivity (TFP)
We present here both deterministic and stochastic estimates of TFP. First we discuss the results of a "deterministic" or "accounting" approach to TFP. Then we present results of a productivity regression which estimates these parameters. Considerable detail is relegated to the Annex 1.
Deterministic Accounting Estimate of TFP
One conventional approach, first followed here, is to use national income data and other information with assumed parameter values, and simply compute estimates of TFP in a deterministic fashion. 14 Our TFP accounting estimate is presented in Figure  13 15 . The rate of growth of capital stock per worker is derived from the estimates of capital stock, and the growth in human capital from the increase in average schooling discussed in the earlier section. Mahajan (2003) . We provide a comparison between out estimates and these other estimates in the Annex 1. 15 The approach described in detail in the Annex 1 is used to compute the contributions of the growth rate of physical capital per worker and changes in average schooling to the growth rate of output per worker. In the base year, TFP is normalized by assuming that it equals unity. Then, one computes the levels by computing the cross products from t = 0 to time period t of one plus the rates of growth for time periods zero to t.
had fallen steadily by 50 percentage points since 1979, and TFP was lower than it had been in 1960 (off 30 percentage points). Alarmingly, TFP has trended downward strongly since 1998, boding ill for the future. Depending upon how one chooses to interpret TFP, Cote d'Ivoire is experiencing negative technological progress, or negative gains in efficiency over time. The value added above and beyond the contributions of physical and human capital appears to be shrinking.
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According to this estimate, the steady decline in output per worker in the Cote d'Ivoire in the 1980s and 1990s is not just a result of falling capital stock per worker. It also appears to be a result of falling total factor productivity per worker.
Stochastic Regression Model of Factor Productivity
An alternative approach, a stochastic regression model of factor productivity (which estimates parameter values) is also used to evaluate the validity of the deterministic TFP analysis in the last section. 17 The results were satisfactory, especially when on considers that the sample is small, the main explanatory variables were estimates that we constructed, and that many analysts had major difficulties with the data on countries from Sub-Saharan Africa. 18 We ran a multivariate, Cobb-Douglas style "factor" model of productivity, which uses our estimate of capital stock per worker and adds a term for human capital, in this case a term representing our estimate of average schooling per worker. The coefficient point estimates for physical capital and labor are close to what is expected 19 . While the estimate for physical capital seems robust and precise, the human capital coefficient estimate has a wide confidence interval and low T-statistic.
The terms of trade appear to account for at least part of the decline in TFP. The concept of "Solow-residual" TFP is not directly observable; there is no times series of direct observations to rely upon. For regression analysis, economists have traditionally used proxy variables or instrumental variables. But, in Cote d'Ivoire specifically and (and in some other developing countries 20 ), TFP growth over time is not a simple quasi-linear trend. Proxies or instruments must be carefully selected. We noted during the analysis that the TPF measured by the accounting (i.e., deterministic) method had a time profile rather similar to the time profile of the terms of trade. In this context, if world prices for commodity exports increase, the resulting additional value added contributes to the "residual", TFP. If, on the other hand, prices of imported production inputs increase, the 16 Note that if we are overestimating the contribution of either factor, for example overestimating human capital by overestimating schooling or "worker quality", the net result would be to underestimate TFP. 17 See Bosworth & Collins (2003) , Cohen & Sots (2001) , and Ghosh & Kraay (2000) 18 For example, Bosworth and Collins (2003) did not extend their global TFP estimates to Africa in their paper "The Empirics of Growth: An Update", September 22, 2003. 19 See the Annex 1 for a detailed analysis of expected parameter estimation results. The schooling coefficient point estimate comes in at b 2 = 0.0553, not far from the "ballpark" expected value of 0.079 (which we would revise downward anyway if we accept the proposition that Cote d'Ivoire has a high MPK and hence a > 0.35). 20 See for example Bosworth and Collins (2003) , specifically the graphs in second page of the Appendix. residual value added is reduced. That is, for a small trading economy, the terms of trade affects the value added of production. A one percent change in the rate of change in terms of trade results in a one-tenth of a percent change in the measured real value of per capita output. Table 5 presents the coefficient estimates, measures of "goodness of fit", and tests of certain hypotheses about parameter values, for a regression "explaining" the rate of growth of output per worker as a result of the growth rate of physical capital per worker, the increase of average schooling per worker (representing growth in human capital), and the rate of change of the terms of trade. 22 The rate of change of the terms of trade is taken as an important determinant of or proxy for Total Factor Productivity 23 . A one percent change in the rate of change in terms of trade results in a one-tenth of a percent change in the measured real value of per capita output. A dummy variable added for the internal conflict in [2000] [2001] [2002] provided an estimate that conflict knocked -3.8% off the expected growth rates for those three years, for a cumulative effect of 11% for the three years.
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Concluding Remarks
The preceding analysis suggests several conclusions, an important policy implication for diversification, and some avenues for further research on Cote d'Ivoire's economy.
First, Cote d'Ivoire's long-term per capita growth performance is not fully explained by either the over-valuation of the CFA in late 1980s and early 1990s, nor by the recent conflict. While the impact of the conflict was severe--especially on the social front--longer term factors such as capital accumulation, total factor productivity, and terms of trade are key to understanding the country's performance over these four 21 For a trading nation, the prices of exports and imported inputs already appear in the national income accounting statistics used to compute TFP. In the Annex 1, we first present an intuitive explanation, and then an algebraic manipulation of national income identities to show the link between the terms of trade and TFP. 22 The coefficient point estimates for the contributions of physical capital and human capital (schooling) differ somewhat but not significantly from the values often assumed in the literature, and from those which were assumed in the accounting TPF estimate presented earlier.
decades as is, in part, the choice of development policy in the early 1970s and earlier to specialize in cocoa and massively expand cocoa bean production. This is notwithstanding the facts that part of this specialization was an endogenous response of cocoa farmers to high international prices and that some diversification did occur with the development of light manufacturing and food processing.
Second, the long-term decline in per capita output is related to the secular deterioration in terms of trade. The per capita decline in output started well before the pronounced currency overvaluation, and at a time of political stability. It is related to a major deterioration in terms of trade that started after 1976.
Third, total factor productivity estimates indicate that TFP per capita grew until it hit a plateau in 1976-78, and then shrank thereafter despite gains in human capital accumulation. A Cobb-Douglas productivity regression validates the accounting TFP estimate and provides evidence for a major turnaround and subsequent, secular deterioration in the terms of trade, which partly explains the decline in per capita output and falling TFP. A related long-term trend reinforcing the terms of trade impact was the depreciation of the U.S. dollar vis-à-vis the French franc since the 1985 Plaza Accord. As a result, the government's strategy of cocoa specialization has been defeated by cocoa and other commodity price trends. In short, the bet on a single raw commodity to finance development efforts failed. The dependence upon cocoa seems to be at least one important explanatory factor for Cote d'Ivoire's growth profile and particularly the post-1980 decline.
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Looking forward, Cote d'Ivoire faces twin challenge for development policy of both short-term (restoring stability on political and security fronts) and long-term nature (restarting structural reforms). While ending the conflict is important for short-term economic recovery and political stabilization, it is only a first step towards sustainable recovery. Improving governance at all levels, restructuring and diversifying the economy for more balanced, long-term growth will be critical in reversing the long-term economic trends of the past two and a half decades.
Diversification opportunities should be identified and pursued vigorously. Cocoa takes seven years to become commercially productive after initial planting, and has a useful life of three to four decades. The investment in productive cocoa acreage represents sunk costs, and it may not pay to uproot and replant with another crop. But cocoa first planted in the 1960s and 1970s may be nearing the end of its useful life. Therefore, studies on agricultural, technological, and financing aspects of the feasibility of using some of the land for planting some other crop or economic activity with higher value added potential, rather than replanted with cocoa, may be timely. Such studies may also help Cote d'Ivoire to develop a timely diversification strategy and action plan leading to actual diversification while avoiding re-investment expenses. Given its global market power, Cote d'Ivoire's reduction in cocoa output may help raise cocoa prices somewhat, thereby raising returns on the remaining acreage. Studies of the feasibility of replacing cocoa acreage on an orderly basis, and developing a broader diversification strategy, and an implementation plan, might contribute to a less specialized and more robust economy.
ANNEX ONE: Methodological Notes
This annex provides detail on the estimates of human and physical capital underlying the total factor productivity analysis, as well as further detail on the TFP analysis. 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 1 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 3 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 8 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 Year Below we provide step-by-step detail on our procedure for estimating the average years of schooling per worker in Cote d'Ivoire.
Estimating the Average Schooling of Workers
• First, the adult literacy rate for 1970 through 1998, available in the Bank's SIMA database (new Development Data Base--DDP), was extrapolated back to 1960 based on the 1970-1980 rate of increase, and forward to 2002 based on the 1988-1998 rate.
• We then calculated the total number of adults in the population by subtracting the number of children 14 years old and under from the total population; both series are found in the Bank's SIMA (current DDP database).
• Next, we estimated the rate at which literate adults participate in the labor force.
The assumed "literate labor force participation rate" is very high, but trending down somewhat as literacy increases. The assumption is that there is career training specialization in Cote d'Ivoire. In the largely rural environment, persons planning to remain engaged in the within-household production typically do not invest in an education and hence often remain illiterate while persons planning to participate in the formal labor force seek education.
• This allowed us to estimate the literacy rate among workers. Due to the low but rising literacy rate in the population, and the high proclivity among the educated to participate in the labor force, the labor force is much more literate than the general population of adults.
• We estimated the average number of years in school or average educational attainment for literate persons. The regular social surveys of Cote d'Ivoire ask this question of a fairly large sample of respondents. In 2002, for example, the average schooling per worker was 7.7 years, higher in urban areas and in industry, lower in rural areas and in agriculture. There is also some information as to how long students stay in school, conditional upon whether or not they enroll in the first place
• The average schooling per worker in the labor force is the product of the estimated labor force literacy rate times the estimated average schooling of those who are literate.
The accompanying table A-2 below provides the data and estimates used. The estimated average schooling per worker developed here is higher than those typically encountered in the literature (for example, Pradeep Mahajan (2003) , Bosworth & Collins (2003) or Cohen & Soto (2001) ). Some authors do not provide estimates for Cote d'Ivoire (e.g. Barro et al) while others cite problems with the data from Sub-Saharan Africa. Some seem to rely on the literacy rate of the general population as a proxy for educational attainment of the work force. 
Estimating the Capital Stock: Sensitivity to Initial Capital and Depreciation
We followed a conventional approach in the literature in using the "perpetual inventory" estimates of capital stock based on accumulated gross capital formation (investment) adjusted for depreciation. Such estimates are sensitive to the assumptions employed.
We assumed that gross capital formation was available to facilitate production within the recorded year. Investments in upgrading agricultural land are typically made just prior to planting, so the benefit of the capital stock is enjoyed in the same year. Vehicles and machinery are similarly employed right away.
We assumed a depreciation rate of 10%. Others sometimes assume 6% or 8%. We argue for the 10% rate in this case on the grounds that capital investments made in a developing tropical agricultural country in general, and Cote d'Ivoire specifically, depreciate quickly. Tropical arable land will return to forest quickly if not rigorously maintained. Rural building of local construction similarly depreciates quickly, unless kept up. Machinery and vehicles are worked very hard and so also wear out quickly.
The basic algorithm used here was that current physical capital stock equals last year's capital stock less depreciation of 10%, plus this year's gross capital formation. Some analysts use the assumption that investment takes time to mobilize in production, and update last period's depreciated capital with last periods gross capital formation, when computing current period capital stock.
For presenting descriptive statistics we used data from SIMA/DDP database and worked in constant US dollars per capita, to facilitate reader's comparisons with the statistics of other countries outside the CFA zone. For Figure 10 and for Figure 11 in the main text above, we assumed an initial per worker capital stock of US$ 2,200 in 1995 dollars. For constant CFA, this amount was translated at 240 CFA per dollar. For the productivity regressions, as is common in the literature, we used constant local currency units under the argument that producers make their production choices based on local not world prices. (For CFA Franc countries the differences between dollar prices and local currency unit prices are not very large)
Next, we test the initial capital and depreciation rate assumptions in constant 1995 CFA Francs. Figure A-2 shows the profile of the capital stock assumption over time for the baseline, and then with an initial capital stock reduced by the CFA equivalent of $1,000, and then increased by $1,000. Varying initial capital stock by almost 50% has amazingly little impact on the time profile of capital stock over time, and no discernable impact after ten or twelve years. Part of this may be sue to the fact that the baseline assumes a 10% depreciation rate. 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 Next, we considered four different depreciation rates (Figure A-3 ). Here the difference in levels persists throughout the time series. In particular, the peak capital stock level in 1983 increases from CFAF 9.6 trillion (depreciation rate =10%) to CFAF 10.79 trillion (depreciation rate = 8%) to CFAF 12.38 trillion (6%) to CFAF 14.25 trillion (4%). The lower the depreciation rate, the longer capital "stays in the system," so the peak slides from 1982 (at 10%) to 1983 (at 6% or lower).
But, the time profile of capital stock remains remarkably similar for quite different depreciation rate assumptions. In particular, regardless of the depreciation rate used, gross capital stock in the economy flattens or decreases after the early 1980s. So, almost regardless of the depreciation rate chosen (within a wide range), the method generates the estimate that capital stock per worker began to decline after the early 1980s.
It appears that when using the "perpetual inventory" method of estimating capital stock, the main determinant of capital stock seem to be the investment flows, or gross capital formation. Initial capital stock and the depreciation rate, although important, are by comparison second-order determinants. This is reassuring as the perpetual inventory method is fairly robust in the presence of uncertainty about initial capital and depreciation.
Calculating TFP and Productivity Regressions
Calculating Total Factor Productivity
Conceptually, output is generated by a production function which uses as inputs factors of production: physical capital; human capital (which is the labor force adjusted for quality), and a host of other factors. Physical capital can be inferred from observed investment flows. Human capital can be estimated based on the labor force and educational attainment. The effect of all other factors, or total factor productivity (TFP), is commonly estimated as the "Solow-residual" when the factor shares for the contribution of physical and human capital are subtracted from output.
Starting with the familiar Cobb Douglas production function and assuming constant returns to scale, output Y in time period t is a function of capital K, labor L adjusted for quality by H, and all other factors in that time period, A. Variables are subscripted by t. The marginal return on physical capital, a, is assumed based on experience and other estimates to be 0.35, while the return on human capital is 0.65, for the world in general. 25
Y = AK a (LH) (1-a)
Worker quality H is assumed to be a function of average schooling per worker, s. The rate of return to education in Africa has been estimated at 13%. Two functional forms are found in the literature:
2.a H = (1.13) This functional form has the advantage that it is stated in growth rates, independent of units (currency units or manpower headcounts) and independent of conversion factors between capital, output, and labor. One then finds the rate of change in per capita TFP over time by re-arranging this equation, subtracting from the growth of output the shareweighted growth rates of capital per worker and the presumed growth in worker effectiveness as measured by average years schooling.
Comparison With Deterministic TFP Estimates by the World Bank
Sandeep Matajan (2003) has recently developed robust estimates of Solow-residual total factor productivity and the other related variable for numerous countries. These are found on the World Bank's intranet. These estimates are shown below, in Figure A -4.
To compare these estimates with those generated in this paper, Figure A -5 presents the Mahajan estimates in index form. These are readily comparable with the indices created for this paper found on Figure 10 . The major difference is that this paper focuses on per worker productivity, capital, TFP, etc. To make the Mahajan estimates more comparable, one might subtract the difference of logs of the labor force (labor force growth) from Mahajan's capital stock growth rate and TFP growth, dragging down estimated TFP. In any event, the TFP indices created for this paper and the indices created from these World Bank sources have the same general profile.
The World Bank spreadsheet includes a summary for Cote d'Ivoire, presented in Figure  14 These also are not in per-worker form. They are quite like the estimates in this paper: output, physical capital and TFP grow strongly in the 1960s and 1970s, and weakly thereafter. In particular they grow more slowly than the labor force, so would be resoundingly negative (like ours) if put in per-worker terms. Human capital grows strongly throughout (like ours), as the labor force grows, and increases in quality. 1 9 6 1 1 9 6 4 1 9 6 7 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 3 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 7 2 0 0 0 1 9 6 0 1 9 6 2 1 9 6 4 1 9 6 6 1 9 6 8 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 These two sets of estimates (in this paper versus those of Mahajan) were arrived at independently, and differ in assumptions and details of their calculations, and perhaps some differences in input data. Nevertheless, they present very similar profiles of the evolution of TFP and its components for Cote d'Ivoire. 
Stochastic Regression Model of Factor Productivity
We now turn from a deterministic "accounting" model of factor productivity (which asserts parameter values) to a stochastic regression model of factor productivity (which estimates parameter values). By fitting such a model, we can verify to some extent the validity of the analysis in the last section. We will use the capital and labor-quality variables developed for the deterministic calculations, and test them in an econometric model. 26 We performed standard Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Tests (assuming no constant or trend in the ADF test equation) on the natural logarithms (logs) of the variables we used: real output per worker and estimated capital stock per worker (in constant local currency, CFA franc), schooling per worker, and the index of terms of trade (normalized to unity). As expected, there existed unit roots in the levels, but all variables were integrated of order one (stationary in the first differences). The ADF Z(t) statistic was less than 5% critical value in all cases, usually less than 1%. So, our point of departure is to estimate the regressions in the first differences (an error-correction model exists for the levels). Since these are logged variables (except for average schooling), the first differences are the estimates of the growth rates.
The results were satisfactory, especially when on considers that the sample is small, the main explanatory variables were estimates we constructed, and that many analysts have experienced major difficulties with data from Sub-Saharan Africa.
27 Furthermore, there is presumably a whole host of other omitted factors (variables) "explaining" productivity, such as policy, warfare, institutional factors, politics, the environment, and so forth.
A point of departure is simple, univariate, ordinary least squares (OLS) model of growth of output per worker as a function of the growth of capital stock per worker (A-3). Table A This univariate OLS regression seems surprisingly robust. The residuals are reasonably well-behaved, and the capital coefficient estimate is of plausible magnitude with the correct sign and a small standard error, hence yielding a "good" T-statistic. This one variable "explains" a considerable part of the dependent variable. We conduct a test of whether the coefficient estimate equals the "standard" of 0.35 and reject the hypothesis, accepting the alternative hypothesis that it is higher than 0.35. Capital stock per worker is a major determinant of productivity in Cote d'Ivoire.
Consider next a bivariate "factor" model of productivity, which adds a term for human capital to the univariate regression above, in this case the first differences of our estimate of average schooling per worker. The schooling coefficient point estimate comes in at b 2 = 0.0553, not far from the "ballpark" expected value of 0.079 (which we would revise downward anyway if we accept the proposition that Cote d'Ivoire has a high MPK and hence a > 0.35). However, the coefficient estimate has a wide confidence interval and low T. It seems that our estimate of human capital is imprecise, but of some utility.
Total Factor Productivity in a deterministic framework is a residual, that share of output that is not attributed to quality-adjusted labor (human capital) or physical capital. The concept of "Solow-residual" TFP is not directly observable; there is no times series of direct observations to rely upon. For the regression analysis, analysts have traditionally used proxy variables or instrumental variables, ranging from the urbanization rate or population, to trend variables, and so forth. But, in Cote d'Ivoire specifically and (and in some other developing countries 28 TFP growth over time is not a simple quasi-linear trend; it grew in the 1960s and 1970s and plunged thereafter. Proxies or instruments must be carefully selected.
We noted during the analysis that the TPF measured in the last section by accounting methods had a time profile rather similar to the time profile of the terms of trade. Recall, the terms of trade rose in the early years as the price index of Cote d'Ivoire's exports rose above the price index for its imports; later the reverse occurred. From an empirical point of view, terms of trade seemed a good proxy or instrument for TFP.
From a conceptual perspective, much of Cote d'Ivoire's output is sold abroad, while many physical capital and other production inputs are purchased from abroad. So, if world prices for commodity exports increases, the extra value added contributes to the "residual", TFP. If prices of imported production inputs increase, the residual value added is reduced. That is, for a small trading economy, the terms of trade impact the value added of economic production. In a sense, we are simply inserting relative world prices into the equations of the Cobb-Douglas production function considered earlier. If Cote d'Ivoire is a price taker on world markets, these prices are exogenous. Table A -4 presents the coefficient estimates and measures of "goodness of fit" for a regression "explaining" the rate of growth of output per worker as a result of the growth rate of physical capital per worker, the increase of average schooling per worker (representing growth in human capital), and the rate of change of the terms of trade. The rate of change of the terms of trade is taken as an important determinant of or proxy for Total Factor Productivity. The coefficient point estimates for the contributions of physical capital and human capital (schooling) differ somewhat from the values often assumed in the literature, and from those which were assumed in the accounting TPF estimate presented earlier, but not enough to warrant recalculating TFP. A one percent change in the rate of change in terms of trade results in a one-tenth of a percent change in the measured value of per capita output.
More polished versions of this model might be obtained with further effort. The results seem to generally validate the TFP accounting estimates, which showed a decline in TFP in recent years in Cote d'Ivoire, rather than growth. The results also suggest that for small open trading countries like Cote d'Ivoire, the terms of trade are important explanatory factors for economic productivity and output growth.
We experimented, substituting the literacy rate for our schooling measure. The coefficient point estimate was large and negative, albeit with a rather large confidence interval and low t-statistic. We conclude that however imprecise our schooling measure may be, especially as a measure of worker quality, it is better than the literacy rate, and better than leaving it out.
The civil war reduced growth. We also found that a dummy variable for the war in 2000-2002 had a coefficient of the right sign and plausible magnitude, with a t-statistic of 1.21 29 . Our best estimate is that the occurrence of the minor conflicts of 2000-2002 knocked 3.8% off the expected growth rates for those three years, for a cumulative effect of 11% for the three years.
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This is a very conservative estimate on at least two considerations. One, it does not take into account the indirect effect on growth via reduced capital investment due to fear of war; capital stock is simply taken as given in this model. Two, the turmoil in 2000-02 mild compared with the civil war that broke out in September 2002. 29 The coefficient point estimate was -.03765 with a standard deviation of 0.03123 30 (1 -03765) raised to the power of three approximately equals 0.8912.
Deriving Specific Hypotheses for Expected Parameter Values
Theoretically, the functional form of our productivity model is given by the usual Cobb-Douglas production function, where output is a function of physical capital, quality adjusted labor, and other explanatory variables X. The point is that depending on the functional form assumed for H, the rate of return to education r or ln(1+r) is associated with the labor factor share (1 -a) and the first differences of the variable s, the average years schooling per worker. The Sample Regression Function (SRF) that we estimate is: Suppose for a moment, as is commonly assumed, that the exponent associated with physical capital is 0.35, so that the coefficient associated with human capital or quality adjusted labor is 0.65. Suppose also that the rate of return to education (RRE) in Africa is high, at 13%. Then we can assign "ballpark" numeric values to the expected values of our sample regression parameter estimates for b 1 and b 2 , under the hypothesis that our PRF and SRF set-up is correct, as follows: 
Y = C(t)K
E{b
How Terms of Trade Impact TFP
Here we first present an intuitive explanation of why the terms of trade impact measured Total Factor Productivity in a trading nation like Cote d'Ivoire which imports capital goods and production inputs, and then sells part of its output abroad.We have observations of the value of GDP or output. We calculate an estimate of the output contribution of quality adjusted labor, and then the output contribution of physical capital stock. The residual or difference is not attributable to capital or labor is "total factor productivity" or TFP. goes up, and consequently the value of GDP (Y) goes up even if physical quantity volumes are held constant. This causes calculated TFP to go up. That is, if the terms of trade improve due to an increase in the prices for exports, the value added in production goes up in a manner not attributable to the two factors of production, physical labor or human capital (labor), so the "residual" estimated TFP goes up. If prices of exports on the world market goes up (or down), the terms of trade improve, and the value of an exporter's GDP goes up (or down).
To produce GDP, investments are made in the physical capital stock and factor inputs, such as vehicles and machinery and fuel, some of which is imported. Consider a deterioration in the terms of trade caused by an increase in the price level of imported capital goods. If the price level of those imported capital items required for production goes up, the estimated share of total output or GDP attributable to capital goes up. All else equal, if GDP is held constant, the calculated TFP goes down when the terms of trade deteriorates due to increases in the price level of imported capital and inputs (and vice versa).
More formally, in the "Solow Residual" framework, total factor productivity is defined as:
Or, TFP equals the value of units of output less the marginal product of capital times the value of capital and less the marginal product of labor time quality-adjusted labor:
Decompose output into the value of exports plus the value of output consumed domestically, and decompose capital into the value of capital imported from abroad plus the value of domestically produced capital:
This definition of TFP holds as an identify. If we differentiate this identity with respect to the price level of exports, we obtain a positive derivative:
Similarly, if we differentiate with respect to the price level of imports applied to capital, we obtain a negative derivative:
Hence for a trading exporting nation which is a price-taker on world markets and imports capital goods and production inputs, we expect fluctuations in the terms of trade (incorporating the ratio of the price levels of imports and exports) to impact Solowresidual TFP so defined in the manner described here. For such nations, we might expect the terms of trade index (or alternately the price levels of imports and for exports) to be a good proxy for TFP in Cobb-Douglas-style productivity regression models.
There is literature on how the terms of trade affect macroeconomic performance. Analysts at the IMF have studied how commodity price "shocks" impact economies 31 . The literature seems to focus on the impact on exchange rates, and the real exchange rate, rather than productivity or Solow-residual-TFPs per se. Here, we provide evidence that commodity price innovations may directly impact measured productivity. It seems very reasonable that the measured output growth of a commodity exporting nation may be impacted by external price shocks, or price trends, in a manner independent of factor employment within the country, This literature notes that commodity price time series are characterized by small downward long-term trends and a great deal of volatility. Some 44 developing nations depend on four commodity exports or less 32 . 33 From SIMA, in constant 1995 US dollars. 34 There are simple arithmetic averages of reported growth rates; they are not weighted by population.
West African Economic and Monetary Union. Figure A-8 shows a graph of annual per capita growth in real output for Cote d'Ivoire, as well as the arithmetic average for the western eight CFA countries which share the CFA franc. Table 6 provides the same information in greater detail, showing the per capita growth rates for each country.
Looking at the graph, we see that Cote d'Ivoire tracks the average of the eight western CFA countries, moving more or less in line with them all, but has lower growth on average than the group. The west CFA group responded to the December 1994 devaluation of the CFA with strong growth, which continued for a few years and then died out. Looking at Table A-5 reveals considerable variation. These results may be skewed by the inclusion of Liberia, which experienced strong growth in the mid 1990s as the country began to recover from it's brutal civil war. Cote d'Ivoire performed below the average in this sample, ranking below the mid point, based on the ten-year average. Liberia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Rwanda and Angola all averaged faster growth over the decade. Cote d'Ivoire outperformed Congo (Brazzaville), Sierra Leone, Burundi and Congo (Kinshasa). Peace may bring opportunity to advance. Countries that resolve their conflicts, or at least end or mitigate them, often grow strongly in subsequent years. There are numerous examples, including Liberia and Sudan and Rwanda recently, and Uganda in earlier years. There can be a distinct "bounce-back" effect; countries resolving their conflicts often recover by growing rapidly for a period of several years, albeit from a lowered base. If Cote d'Ivoire can resolve it's difficulties, the result may be growth.
Many of these African countries experienced very severe conflict, and still managed to grow faster than Cote d'Ivoire. That simple fact may suggest that the recent conflict is not the sole or single major cause of Cote d'Ivoire's slow growth, which after all has persisted now for more than two decades.
According to statistics released by the Center for Systematic Peace, the civil war in Cote d'Ivoire started in 2000 and as of 2002 was still continuing, with about 2,500 "directly related" deaths 36 . They list it as a low-intensity conflict, with a new outbreak in 2002, with "conflict magnitude" or severity rated as only "2" on a scale of 1 to 10 37 . This is a rather small conflict by African standards. In nearby smaller Guinea-Bissau 6,000 died in the 1998-99 coup and civil war. Some 100,000 Eritreans died in the 1998-2000 war with Ethiopia. More than 1.5 million died in Congo (Zaire) between 1996 and 2002. Some 500,000 died in little Rwanda in 1994 alone. Civil war claimed 25,000 in Sierra Leone between 1991 and 2001.Over a million have died in the last twenty years in Sudan. So, things could easily get much worse in Cote d'Ivoire if the conflict is not resolved. The outbreak of civil war in 2003 has not yet been rated in terms of "magnitude", but is presumably much worse than the earlier conflict.
